Islamabad: Balochistan has long been a region marked by bloodshed, enforced disappearances, and systematic oppression. For many Baloch, the persistence of these conditions has made endurance increasingly untenable, pushing communities toward the belief that armed resistance is the only remaining response.
It was this accumulated anger and despair that appeared to erupt recently, when the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) launched one of the most extensive and coordinated offensives in its history. BLA announced that it had launched simultaneous attacks across multiple towns and cities, marking what it called Operation Herof-2. The scale, geographic spread, and political messaging of the operation signal not just an escalation in violence, but a deeper transformation of the conflict itself — one that challenges long-held assumptions about the insurgency’s capacity, direction, and underlying causes.
Unlike earlier waves of violence that were often localised or symbolic, Herof-2 unfolded as a synchronised, province-wide operation. It suggested a level of coordination, manpower, and intelligence penetration that goes beyond sporadic militancy, pointing instead toward a more mature insurgent strategy aimed at overwhelming state capacity while amplifying political messaging.
According to local officials and government sources, violence, clashes, and bombings were reported across at least 16 locations, including Quetta, Nushki, Mastung, Dalbandin, Kalat, Kharan, Panjgur, Gwadar, Pasni, Turbat, Tump, Buleda, Mangochar, Lasbela, Kech, and Awaran. The geographic breadth of the attacks — from coastal districts to mountainous interior regions — underscored the ambition of the operation and its intent to demonstrate reach across the entire province.
In Quetta alone, armed fighters were reportedly seen moving openly with automatic weapons, attacking police posts, burning bank branches, and torching police vehicles in broad daylight. For several hours, parts of the provincial capital appeared effectively paralysed. Similar scenes unfolded in several other towns, where Baloch fighters targetted security installations, transport infrastructure, and symbols of state authority. Videos of fighters patrolling streets and engaging security forces circulated widely on social media before internet shutdowns and information controls were imposed, a familiar tactic in times of unrest.
Security forces claimed that 67 “militants” were killed as they thwarted what they described as coordinated attacks aimed at destabilising the province. The BLA, in contrast, asserted that its fighters struck 48 sites across 14 cities and killed 84 members of the security forces. While these figures remain unverified and likely inflated on both sides, the competing claims themselves point to the unprecedented scope and intensity of the operation.
Reports of suicide bombings and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in Quetta, Gwadar, Pasni, Nushki, and Dalbandin further underline the operational sophistication involved. This was not a symbolic show of force or a limited hit-and-run campaign. It was a province-wide stress test of the state’s security architecture, exposing vulnerabilities across urban centers, highways, border regions, and coastal districts simultaneously. The fact that attacks occurred in areas previously considered relatively secure suggests a recalibration of insurgent capabilities — and a corresponding strain on state responses.
Herof, a Balochi literary term meaning black storm, was first used by the BLA during a wave of attacks in August 2024. Phase-2, however, differs sharply from its predecessor. The current operation is wider in geographic reach, more intense in violence, and reportedly involves a significantly larger number of fighters. Estimates from Pakistan’s Intelligence Bureau in Quetta suggest that between 800 and 1,000 Baloch fighters may be involved, indicating an expansion in recruitment, logistics, and command-and-control structures.
Notably, officials and analysts have pointed to the participation of women in direct combat roles, rather than being limited to suicide attacks — a development that marks a significant shift in the insurgency’s social composition. This evolution suggests both desperation and adaptability, reflecting deeper societal fractures and the erosion of traditional barriers between civilian protest and armed resistance.
Equally significant is the BLA’s evolving media and propaganda strategy. Shortly after the attacks, the group released new footage of its leader, Bashir Zaib, seated on the back of a Honda 125 motorcycle in rugged mountainous terrain believed to lie between Kharan and Chagai. The imagery appears deliberate and carefully curated. Analysts have noted its resemblance to viral images of BLA leaders elsewhere in the region, designed to convey mobility, endurance, territorial familiarity, and defiance.
In this case, the symbolism is sharpened by geography. The Chagai region, particularly around Dalbandin, sits at the heart of Pakistan’s economic ambitions in Balochistan due to vast mineral reserves, including the Reko Diq and Saindak projects. With foreign interest intensifying — most notably a pledged $7 billion investment by Barrick Gold and expected financing from the Asian Development Bank — the appearance of the BLA leader in this area sends a calculated message. It signals the group’s intent and perceived capacity to challenge not only the Pakistani state but also international economic interests operating in the province. By staging this imagery inside Balochistan, the BLA also counters persistent narratives that its leadership operates primarily from across the Afghan border. This serves a dual purpose: reducing diplomatic pressure on Kabul while reinforcing the group’s claim of local legitimacy, rootedness, and popular support within Balochistan itself.
The growing strength and assertiveness of the BLA cannot be understood in isolation from Balochistan’s political trajectory over the past decade, particularly since 2018. That year’s provincial and national elections were widely criticised by opposition parties and civil society groups as manipulated, resulting in a government viewed by many locals as corrupt, unrepresentative, and detached from public grievances. As political avenues narrowed, the province became increasingly militarised. Expanded powers granted to the Counter Terrorism Department and other security agencies were accompanied by persistent allegations of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and custodial deaths.
For many Baloch families, these practices transformed abstract political grievances into deeply personal traumas. Several incidents stand out as turning points. The killing of university student Hayat Baloch by Frontier Corps personnel in August 2020, the earlier killing of Malik Naz inside her home, and the death of Baalach Mula Baksh in CTD custody in November 2023 each triggered waves of protest and intensified public anger. These cases became symbols of impunity, reinforcing perceptions that accountability mechanisms were either ineffective or nonexistent.
The suppression of the ‘Haq Do Tehreek’ movement in Gwadar, prolonged internet shutdowns, restrictions on media coverage, and repeated crackdowns on peaceful demonstrators further eroded faith in non-violent resistance. Each cycle of protest and repression deepened polarization, narrowing the space for dialogue while strengthening arguments for armed struggle. The arrest and continued detention of activist Dr Mahrang Baloch under public order laws has become a focal point for public anger, particularly among younger and urban Baloch. Analysts argue that her imprisonment has accelerated the shift from civil protest to armed resistance, including increased recruitment of women into its ranks.
This trajectory was reinforced by the widely criticised February 2024 elections and official rhetoric that appeared to downplay or dismiss the seriousness of the insurgency. From this perspective, Herof-2 is not simply an armed offensive timed to regional instability in neighbouring Iran or broader geopolitical tensions. It is an argument made through violence: that years of political exclusion, coercive security policies, and denial of structural grievances have transformed a low-level insurgency into a more organised, confident, and lethal conflict.
The operation’s timing, scale, and messaging suggest a deliberate effort to force national and international attention onto a conflict that peaceful mobilization, according to many Baloch, has failed to resolve. In that sense, Herof-2 represents both a tactical escalation and a strategic indictment — one that challenges the assumption that Balochistan’s unrest can be contained through force alone, without addressing the political conditions that continue to fuel it.
–IANS
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